Technical details · Built on TLShare
The key never meets the ciphertext.
InvisiCloud splits the server end of a standard TLS connection between two independently operated parties. Neither ever sees your data in plaintext, and your client doesn’t change.
The core idea
Every TLS record is already split in two.
AES-GCM encrypts by XORing a keystream onto the data. The ciphertext on the wire and the keystream from the session key are two halves of every record. Each half alone looks random. Together they are the plaintext.
In cryptographic terms they are XOR secret shares, exactly what secure multi-party computation (SMPC) takes as input. TLShare only has to keep the halves apart, and it never joins them outside SMPC.
| Ciphertext Payload Gateway | 9f | 3a | c1 | 07 | 41 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Keystream Key Server | d7 | 5f | ad | 6b | 2e |
| Plaintext inside SMPC | 48 H | 65 e | 6c l | 6c l | 6f o |
Other approaches split the key. TLShare keeps the key whole and keeps the ciphertext away from it.
- Handshake
- Plain TLS
- The Key Server completes it alone. No SMPC.
- Into shares
- 1 XOR / byte
- Plus one AES-CTR keystream. Nothing else.
- Client
- Unmodified
- Any standard TLS client. No agent, no SDK.
The protocol
One connection, three phases.
The Payload Gateway receives every byte but holds no key. After the handshake, the Key Server holds the key but sees only metadata.
TLShare also runs in reverse: in client-side mode the two parties jointly act as the TLS client toward an unmodified server, with the same mechanism.
Security model
Who sees what, and what we assume.
| Data | Payload Gateway | Key Server |
|---|---|---|
| TLS private key and session keys | Never sees | Sees |
| Encrypted application records | Sees | Never sees |
| Plaintext Only inside SMPC | Never sees | Never sees |
| Record lengths, sequence numbers, timing Accepted leakage | Sees | Sees |
- A1
No collusion
The Payload Gateway and the Key Server are run by different entities: separate organizations, separate teams, or one team on two hyperscalers so that neither cloud has to be trusted. As long as one of them follows the protocol, nobody learns plaintext.
- A2
Adversary model
Semi-honest by default. A protocol extension adds active security: the AES-GCM tag is verified jointly and the shares become actively secure. Which one fits depends on the application.
- A3
Detectable forgery
In semi-honest mode the Payload Gateway learns the GHASH key to verify tags, which would let it alter records. It commits to each MAC before it receives that key, so tampering is detectable.
- A4
No bypass
The Key Server accepts no direct connections. Repointing the domain to itself would be publicly visible in DNS.
Measured cost
About one round trip per message.
Because the handshake needs no SMPC, the overhead is mostly network distance between the Payload Gateway and the Key Server.
- per warm message
- +1.1 ms
- 32 B to 16 KiB: 5.4 ms vs 4.3 ms with plain TLS
- plain-TLS throughput
- 1.02×
- 4 connections: 290 vs 284 MiB/s, bounded by the link
- per handshake
- +0.24 ms
- TLS 1.3 on loopback, before network round trips
Where the extra 1.1 ms goes (warm message, median)
One round trip between the Payload Gateway and the Key Server, plus about 0.4 ms of computation.
- Plain TLS 4.3 ms
- Gateway ↔ Key Server 0.73 ms
- TLShare work 0.4 ms
Show throughput table
| Transfer | Plain TLS | TLShare | Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|
| 64 MiB, TLS 1.3, 1 connection | 199 MiB/s | 153 MiB/s | 0.77 |
| 64 MiB, TLS 1.3, 4 connections | 284 MiB/s | 290 MiB/s | 1.02 |
| 64 MiB, TLS 1.2, 1 connection | 172 MiB/s | 114 MiB/s | 0.66 |
| 256 MiB, TLS 1.3, 1 connection | 181 MiB/s | 179 MiB/s | 0.99 |
| 256 MiB, TLS 1.2, 1 connection | 197 MiB/s | 119 MiB/s | 0.60 |
Preliminary medians. AWS Frankfurt, Payload Gateway and Key Server in different availability zones (0.73 ms round trip), client on Hetzner (4.4 ms). 2,056 messages each way, all decoded correctly. Single-connection throughput is 0.60–0.99× of plain TLS; with four connections the network link, not TLShare, is the limit.
Deployment & scope
What it needs, what it supports.
Deployment
- Operators
- Managed setup: utilacy runs the Payload Gateway, you or a trusted partner run the Key Server.
- DNS
- The Key Server owns the domain and keeps the private key. A/AAAA records point to the Payload Gateway.
- Certificates
- DNS-01 challenge, or HTTP-01 challenges forwarded to the Key Server.
- Clients
- Any standard TLS client, unchanged.
Protocol scope
- TLS
- TLS 1.2 and 1.3, AES-GCM cipher suites only.
- Applications
- Any protocol over TLS: HTTP, REST, FTPS, SMTP. InvisiCloud Objects speaks S3; the InvisiCloud Files web app talks to it over HTTPS.
- Disabled
- Session resumption and 0-RTT (enforced). Session tickets off by default.
- Unsupported
- TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate: the connection fails at the next record. Alerts pass through as shares.
Compare approaches
Different approaches. Different trade-offs.
Common security architectures prioritize confidentiality, compatibility, and control differently.
| Approach | Confidentiality | Trust & control | Compatibility | Setup complexity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Server-side encryption | Provider may access plaintext | Trust concentrated in provider | Native integration | Low |
| Client-side encryption | Encrypted before upload | Clients hold plaintext & keys | Client changes required | Per-application integration |
| Encryption gateways | Gateway sees plaintext | trusted gateway operator | Supported apps unchanged | Gateway integration |
| Confidential computing | Protected inside enclave | Hardware & attestation trust | Workload adaptations | Enclave integration |
| InvisiCloud | Neither party alone can access plaintext | Control split across independent operators | Existing applications & storage workflows unchanged | Gateway deployment & routing |
Ratings describe typical architectures; effort and protection depend on deployment. InvisiCloud reflects the target architecture and planned capabilities. See Technical Evaluation for current availability.
At the protocol level
TLShare compared with other ways of splitting TLS.
| Approach | What is split | Handshake | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Keyless SSL | Only the private-key operation | Standard | The edge still gets session keys and plaintext |
| TLSNotary, DECO, zkTLS | The client’s session key | Two-party computation | Client side only |
| TLShare | Ciphertext from key | Standard, no SMPC | No single party sees plaintext; server or client side |
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